On prayer and the contemplative life · Aquinas, Saint Thomas

5. Again, the Saints conform their will in all things to the Divine

Chapter 62 of 107 · 3 min read

Will. Therefore they can only will what they know God wills. But no one prays save for what he wishes. Consequently they only pray for what they know God wills. But what God wills would take place whether they prayed or not. Consequently their prayers have no power to obtain things.

But, as is evident from the passage of S. Gregory quoted above in reply to the third difficulty, neither the Saints nor the Angels will anything save what they see in the Divine Will. And consequently they ask for nothing else save this. But it does not follow that their prayers are without fruit, for, as S. Augustine says in his treatise, On the Predestination of the Saints, and S. Gregory in his Dialogues, the prayers of the Saints avail for the predestinate, because perhaps it was pre-ordained that they should be saved by the prayers of those who interceded for them. And so, too, God wills that by the prayers of the Saints should be fulfilled what the Saints see that He wills.

6. Lastly, the prayers of the entire Court of Heaven should, if they can gain anything at all, be far more efficacious than all the suffrages of the Church on earth. But if all the suffrages of the Church on earth were to be accumulated upon one soul in Purgatory, it would be entirely freed from punishment. Since, then, the Saints who are in our Fatherland have the same reason for praying for the souls in Purgatory as they have for praying for us, they would by their prayers, if they could obtain anything for us, wholly deliver from suffering those who are in Purgatory. But this is false, for if it were true, then the suffrages of the Church for the dead would be superfluous.

But the suffrages of the Church for the dead are, as it were, satisfactions offered by the living in place of the dead, and thus they free the dead from that debt of punishment which they have not paid. But the Saints who are in our Fatherland are not capable of making satisfaction. And thus there is no parity between their prayers and the Church's suffrages.

FOOTNOTES:

xiv. 21.

Moralia in Job, xii. 14.

Dialogue, li. 35.

Contra Vigilant., vi.

S. Augustine: Of the Trinity, xiii. 5.

Of the Heavenly Hierarchy, iii.

lxiii. 16.

De Cura Mortuorum, 13, 14, 15.

S. Matt, xviii. 10.

Of the Heavenly Hierarchy, vii.; and Of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, vi.

v. 1.

Moralia in Job, v. 30.

Rom. xv. 30.

Of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, v.

Dan. ix. 14.

Ep. contra Vigilantium, vi.

Apoc. vi. 11.

vi. 10.

xv. 1.

S. Matt. xxii. 30.

x. 12-13.

Moralia on Job, xvii. 12.

De Dono Perseverantiae, xxii.

i. 8.

QUESTION CLXXIX

OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE

I. May Life be fittingly divided into the Active and the Contemplative? S. Augustine, De Consensu Evangelistarum, I., iv. 8 " Tractatus, cxxiv. 5, in Joannem II. Is this division of Life into the Active and the Contemplative a sufficient one? S. Augustine, Of the Trinity, I., viii. 17

I

May Life be fittingly divided into the Active and the Contemplative?

S. Gregory the Great says: "There are two kinds of lives in which Almighty God instructs us by His Sacred Word—namely, the active and the contemplative."

Those things are properly said to live which move or work from within themselves. But what especially accords with the innermost nature of a thing is that which is proper to it and towards which it is especially inclined; consequently every living thing shows that it is living by those very acts which are especially befitting it and towards which it is especially inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in their growing and in their producing seed; the life of animals in their feeling and moving; while that of man consists in his understanding and in his acting according to reason.

Hence among men themselves each man's life appears to be that in which he takes special pleasure, that with which he is particularly occupied, that, in fine, in which each one wishes to live with a friend, as is said in the Ethics of Aristotle.

Since, then, some men are especially occupied with the contemplation of the truth while others are especially-occupied with external things, man's life may be conveniently divided into the active and the contemplative.

Some, however, repudiate this division, thus: